Classifying Privacy and Verifiability Requirements for Electronic Voting by Langer, Lucie et al.
Classifying Privacy and Verifiability Requirements
for Electronic Voting
Lucie Langer, Axel Schmidt, Melanie Volkamer, Johannes Buchmann
CASED
Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt
{langer, axel, buchmann}@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de, volkamer@cased.de
Abstract: Voter privacy and verifiability are fundamental security concepts for elec-
tronic voting. Existing literature on electronic voting provides many definitions and
interpretations of these concepts, both informal and formal. While the informal defini-
tions are often vague and imprecise, the formal definitions tend to be very complex and
restricted in their scope as they are usually tailored for specific scenarios. Moreover,
some of the existing interpretations are contradictory.
This paper provides informal, yet precise definitions of anonymity, receipt-freeness
and coercion-resistance and identifies different levels of individual and universal veri-
fiability. The overarching goal of this paper is to investigate which levels are conceiv-
able for implementing these requirements in e-voting systems for elections of different
significance (for instance political elections vs. elections in associations).
1 Introduction
A fundamental objective for democratic elections is secrecy of the vote. It requires that
only the voter knows his voting decision and nobody else is able to gain information about
it. For federal elections of the German Bundestag, this objective is even laid down in
German Constitutional Law, which emphasizes its importance. Secrecy of the vote is also
a precondition of casting one’s vote freely and without coercion [MGKQ03]. If the voter
fears that his decision becomes public in the future, the freedom of vote is clearly limited.
Therefore it is important that the voter’s decision remains secret also in the long term,
i.e. when a dozen years or more have passed since the election. German Constitutional
Law even requires the secrecy of the vote to hold forever [Wil02].
Recently, the use of specific electronic voting machines in the last federal election of the
German Bundestag was ruled unconstitutional by the German Federal Constitutional Court
[Cou]. The reason for this decision was that the voting machines used failed to provide a
sufficient level of verifiability. In particular, the judgement claims that the voter must be
able to verify that his vote was recorded as intended without having detailed knowledge
of computer technology. This shows the importance of verifiability for legally binding
electronic elections.
From a more technical point of view, there is an established set of security requirements
for electronic voting [Rie98, BM03, JdV06, Cet07]. The legal terms of secrecy and free-
dom of vote on the one hand and verifiability on the other hand can be mapped to these
requirements as follows: According to [VH04], “the legal objectives of free and secret
elections are related to anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance of electronic
voting”. Thus, to ensure secrecy and freedom of vote, voting schemes should strive for
anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance, preferably in the long term. The le-
gal obligation for verifiability is captured by the security requirements in two different
forms: While individual verifiability refers to the individual voter, universal verifiability
refers to the public.
Existing literature on electronic voting provides many definitions and interpretations of
these security requirements. While the informal definitions tend to be sketchy and impre-
cise, the formal definitions usually are very complex and tailored for specific scenarios
given by specific voting protocols or assuming particular attack models. Moreover, the
extent of the security requirements considered is understood differently and some of the
existing interpretations are even contradictory.
Our paper provides informal, yet precise definitions of individual and universal verifiabil-
ity, anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. The goal is to make a first step
towards providing an overview of the different levels which are conceivable for imple-
menting the security requirements for electronic voting in practice. The result can support
persons in charge (e.g. election hosts) in deciding which level of the respective requirement
they want to meet with regard to the priority of either verifiability or voter privacy.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review existing definitions and inter-
pretations of the requirements under consideration. Section 3 provides our definitions and
classifications. The relations between the requirements are analyzed in Section 4. Section
5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Review of Existing Definitions and Interpretations
2.1 Privacy Requirements
In the literature reviewed there is a general consent that a voting scheme offers privacy if it
is not possible to link a vote with the voter who cast it. More precisely, privacy means that
nobody should learn more information about any voter’s decision than what is leaked by
the tally [CMFP+06, MN06]: If all voters vote identically, then it is clear how each voter
voted. The notions of (voter) privacy and (ballot) secrecy are often used synonymously
[Hir01, CRS05, MN06]; some authors refer to anonymity instead [Rie98]. Hirt distin-
guishes between secrecy and anonymity: While secrecy is defined as the infeasibility to
assign votes to voters, anonymity refers to the impossibility to tell whether a certain voter
voted or not [Hir01]. The need for long-term voter privacy is usually neglected. Only
[CMFP+06, MN06, Cet07] incorporate this temporal aspect in their definition of privacy.
Chevallier-Mames et al. point out this property by using the expression “unconditional
privacy” [CMFP+06], Moran and Naor use “everlasting privacy” [MN06].
Receipt-freeness is commonly defined as the infeasibility for the voter to prove his vote
(even if he wants to do so). Smith illustratively names this property “no sale” [Smi05]. Un-
coercibility is in general understood as the infeasibility for an adversary to coerce a voter
into casting his vote in a particular way. Riera defines a voting scheme to be uncoercible if
“no voter can prove that he voted in a particular way” [Rie98] and hence takes uncoercibil-
ity for what generally is understood as receipt-freeness. Moran and Naor provide a very
strong notion of receipt-freeness [MN06]: The adversary can coerce the voters at any time
during the execution of the voting protocol and is not limited to passive queries. Similarly,
for their definition of receipt-freeness, Chevallier-Mames et al. allow interactions with the
adversary before and after the vote [CMFP+06]. They also assume that the adversary can
tap the channel between the voter and the voting authority.
In contrast to this, Hirt states that receipt-freeness cannot be achieved without some phys-
ical assumptions, the weakest assumption being one-way untappable channels from the
authorities to the voters. Similarly, Juels et al. state that anonymous channels are a mini-
mal requirement for any coercion-resistant scheme: “An attacker that can identify which
voters have participated can obviously mount a forced-abstention attack” [JCJ05]. Accord-
ing to Hirt, “the concept of incoercibility is weaker than receipt-freeness” [Hir01]. This
assertion is also made by Burmester and Magkos [BM03]: Deniable encryption allows a
voter to lie about his encrypted vote, but he can refrain from using this mechanism if he
wants to prove his vote. Thus, Burmester and Magkos assert that it is possible to have a
voting scheme which is uncoercible and yet not receipt-free.
However, the relation between receipt-freeness and uncoercibility is usually understood
contrarily: Uncoercibility is stronger than receipt-freeness [JCJ05, Smi05, Cet07, DKR09,
KT09]. According to [DKR09] and [KT09], uncoercibility even implies receipt-freeness,
which is formally proven by the authors. [KT09] uses a symbolic setting based on an
epistemic approach, while [DKR09] makes use of the applied pi calculus. However, their
definition of coercion-resistance does not consider randomization and forced abstention
attacks as introduced in [JCJ05]. Juels et al. provide formal definitions of coercion-
resistance and (universal) verifiability [JCJ05]. Their definitions hinge on several experi-
ments involving an adversary in interaction with components of the voting system.
2.2 Verifiability Requirements
Individual verifiability is commonly referred to as the possibility for any voter to verify that
his vote was included in the tally [Hir01]. Some authors consider individual verifiability
to comprise the correct counting of the votes [Rie98, CRS05, Smi05]. [Rie98], [BM03]
and [LGT+03] also take into account the chance for open objections made by the voter
without sacrificing privacy.
Universal verifiability can be summarized as the possibility for any observer to check
that the tally has been correctly computed. Some authors include the property that the
tallied votes were cast by legitimate voters in the notion of universal verifiability [Smi05,
Hir01], others do not [Hir01, MN06]. Universal verifiability is closely related to accuracy,
i.e. the requirement that no vote can be altered, duplicated or eliminated [Rie98, BM03].
Cetinkaya states that verifiability is “the provability that the election is accurate” [Cet07].
Thus, Cetinkaya argues that universal verifiability is not an e-voting security requirement
on its own, because “if a protocol claims that it satisfies accuracy, it should be able to prove
its claim” [Cet07].
Karlof et al. use the notions “cast as intended” and “counted as cast” and postulate veri-
fiability for both: The voter should be able to verify that his ballot indeed represents the
vote cast, and everyone should be able to verify that the final tally is an accurate count
of the ballots cast [KSW05]. Benaloh introduces the notion of “end-to-end-verifiability”:
“Voters and any other interested parties also gain the capability to check that all votes are
associated with legitimate voters and are properly tallied” [Ben06]. Thus, individual and
universal verifiability are not distinguished.
With regard to the relation between universal and individual verifiability, [LGT+03] and
[BM03] state that individual verifiability (or “atomic” verifiability as named in the lat-
ter) is weaker than universal verifiability. This perception can be explained by the fact
that Burmester and Magkos have a strong understanding of universal verifiability: “Any
observer can be convinced that the election is accurate and that the published tally is cor-
rectly computed from votes that were correctly cast” [BM03].
Formal definitions of universal verifiability have been provided in [JCJ05, CMFP+06];
they are not further discussed here.
3 Definitions and Classifications
In the following we provide definitions and classifications of privacy and verifiability re-
quirements for electronic voting schemes. The definitions are informal enough to be un-
derstood by readers without detailed technical knowledge in order to allow for an interdis-
ciplinary discussion, and yet precise enough to capture any logical relations, for example
the implications shown in [DKR09] and [KT09]. We assume the existence of a public bul-
letin board as this is a fundamental means to ensure individual and universal verifiability
in e-voting.
3.1 Bulletin Board, Ballot and Vote
A bulletin board is a public channel where data can be published by authorized partici-
pants only and, once published, cannot be erased or overwritten by anyone. This communi-
cation model was first presented by Benaloh et al. [CF85, Ben87] and supports verifiability
in electronic voting schemes.
In the following, a ballot denotes the message which is issued by the voter in order to cast
a vote for a specific candidate. The ballot could for example be an encryption of the vote.
3.2 Anonymity, Receipt-freeness and Coercion-resistance
We subsume anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance under the superordinate
concept of privacy. Depending on the connection between the adversary and the voter as
introduced in [KT09], we distinguish the following levels of voter privacy:
Anonymity. The vote cannot be linked to the voter who cast it. There is no communica-
tion channel between the voter and the adversary. The adversary can only use the
information published on the bulletin board.
Receipt-freeness. The voter cannot prove to an adversary how he voted. There is a one-
way communication channel from the voter to the adversary: The voter can send
messages to the adversary but the adversary cannot send messages to the voter. Ad-
ditionally, the adversary can use the information published on the bulletin board.
Coercion-resistance. The adversary cannot coerce the voter to vote in a particular way.
There is a two-way communication channel between the voter and the adversary:
Both voter and adversary can send messages to each other. Additionally, the adver-
sary can use the information published on the bulletin board.
If we do not assume the use of voting booths, then privacy is usually achieved by cryp-
tographic means. It is well known that cryptosystems which provide only computational
security may be broken at some point in the future, e.g. by brute force attacks based on
increased computational power or by solving an underlying mathematical problem that is
widely believed, though unproved, to be hard. Thus, each of the properties defined above
can possibly apply in the long term or in the short term.
We define in the short term to be a period of up to ten years as it is reasonable to assume
that cryptographic algorithms remain secure at least for this period of time if the underlying
parameters (e.g. keylength) are chosen properly. This should also cover the legislative
period of the elected body in most cases. By contrast, in the long term refers to the time
when 20 years or more have passed since the election was carried out. Cryptographic
primitives used e.g. for encryption will possibly have been broken at that time. It might
be argued that a voter’s decision will not be a matter of interest 20 years later. However,
when it comes to e-voting in parliamentary elections, long-term anonymity may indeed be
required.
3.3 Individual and Universal Verifiability
For the classification of individual verifiability we use a similar approach as introduced in
[Pie06]. Pieters distinguishes classical and constructive individual verifiability depending
on whether the voter can reconstruct his vote from the information provided. We distin-
guish weak, average and strong individual verifiability. Furthermore, for each of these
levels we distinguish if individual verifiability is restricted to the voting phase before tal-
lying and thus to the vote cast by the voter, or if it extends to the phase after tallying and
thus to the vote counted for the voter.1 These two variants are indicated in the following
by the terms before / after and cast / counted.
Weak individual verifiability before / after tallying. The voter can verify that his ballot
has been cast / counted, i.e. is published on the bulletin board before / after tallying.
There is no verifiability or proof provided regarding the question whether the ballot
has been cast / counted as intended.
Average individual verifiability before / after tallying. The voter can verify that his bal-
lot has been cast / counted, i.e. is published on the bulletin board before / after tally-
ing. Additionally, he is furnished with a proof that the ballot has been cast / counted
as intended. The voter cannot verify the correct content of the ballot in terms of
reconstructing the vote from the information he is provided with.
Strong individual verifiability before / after tallying. The voter can verify that his bal-
lot has been cast / counted, i.e. is published on the bulletin board before / after tal-
lying. Additionally, he can verify that the ballot has been cast / counted as intended
by reconstructing the vote from the information he is provided with.
The voter’s chance of objection in case the ballot has not been cast as intended (or, for
a stronger version, not counted as intended) can be classified as follows: An anonymity-
compromising chance of objection is given if the voter is not able to do an open objection
without sacrificing anonymity. An anonymity-preserving chance of objection is given if
the voter is able to do an open objection without sacrificing anonymity.
We distinguish weak, average and strong universal verifiability as follows:
Weak universal verifiability. Any interested party can verify that the tally is correctly
computed from votes that were counted. Only the last step of the election procedure
can be verified, i.e. the correct tallying of the votes contained in the ballot box
immediately before the tallying phase.
Average universal verifiability. Any interested party can verify that the tally is correctly
computed from votes that were cast.
Strong universal verifiability. Any interested party can verify that the tally is correctly
computed from votes that were cast by legitimate voters.
4 Analysis
Due to our definitions (and following [DKR09, KT09]), coercion-resistance implies receipt-
freeness, and receipt-freeness implies anonymity: The existence of a two-way communi-
cation channel between the voter and the adversary (scenario of coercion-resistance) is
1It might be argued that you cannot speak of individual verifiability unless the voter is able to verify that his
vote has been included in the tally. However, our goal is to provide all possibilities which are conceivable.
equivalent to two one-way channels and thus clearly implies the existence of a one-way
channel between the voter and the adversary (scenario of receipt-freeness). Intuitively, the
adversary has more capabilities in the scenario of coercion-resistance than in the scenario
of receipt-freeness. This holds for the relation between receipt-freeness and anonymity as
well: If the voter voluntarily provides the adversary with information in addition to the
one which is public, then the adversary has more capabilities than when his knowledge is
restricted to public information (e.g. the final tally).
In contrast to our perception, [Hir01] and [BM03] claim that coercion-resistance is weaker
than receipt-freeness and that it is possible to have a voting scheme which is coercion-
resistant and not receipt-free. Burmester and Magkos give the example of deniable en-
cryption, which allows a voter to lie about his encrypted vote, but cannot prevent him from
proving his vote if he intends to do so [BM03]. According to Juels et al. this is not true:
Deniable encryption does not protect against coercion as the adversary can furnish the
voter with pre-determined parameters [JCJ05]. This is also consistent with our definition
of coercion-resistance: The adversary can use the two-way channel to provide the voter
with the parameters he wants him to use. The understanding of receipt-freeness being
stronger than uncoercibility can be explained by the intuitive conception that it is harder
to take countermeasures against a voter who wants to cooperate with a coercer.
With regard to our classification of individual verifiability, the variant after tallying is
clearly stronger than the one before tallying. If the proof provided for average individual
verifiability after tallying is transferable (i.e. the voter can use it to prove the vote contained
in the ballot to an adversary), then this property is not simultaneously achievable with
receipt-freeness. This corresponds to the assertion by Cetinkaya that there is a trade-
off between receipt-freeness and individual verifiability: If a voting system provides any
receipt enabling the voter to verify his vote in the final tally, then that receipt can also
be used for vote selling [Cet07]. Similarly, Lambrinoudakis et al. identified the conflict
between individual verifiability and uncoercibility [LGT+03].
Regarding our classification of universal verifiability, strong universal verifiability implies
average universal verifiability and average universal verifiability implies weak universal
verifiability: Our definition of weak universal verifiability implies that the requirements of
accuracy and democracy2 may be violated without detection: Altered or duplicated votes
may be included and votes cast by eligible voters may have been eliminated from the ballot
box; multiple votes cast by eligible voters may have been counted as well as votes cast by
voters who are not eligible. Average universal verifiability excludes undetected violation
of accuracy, but not democracy: It is revealed if votes have been altered, duplicated or
eliminated; however, multiple votes cast by eligible voters may have been counted as well
as votes cast by voters who are not eligible. Only strong universal verifiability ensures
that any fraud related to accuracy or democracy will be detected. Note that universal
verifiability does not include verifying that the requirement of anonymity has been met.
2Democracy requires that only eligible voters can vote, and all voters can vote at most once [JdV06].
5 Conclusion
From a legal point of view, secrecy and freedom of vote on one hand and transparency on
the other hand are fundamental objectives for democratic elections and electronic voting
in particular. Secrecy and freedom of vote can be translated to the security requirements
of anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance, while transparency refers to indi-
vidual and universal verifiability. It is a challenge for current voting schemes to reconcile
these properties, particularly in the long term: How can individual verifibility be achieved
without sacrificing anonymity and receipt-freeness or even coercion-resistance in the long
term?
While for federal elections we should strive for the optimum, one could make concessions
for subordinate elections. Depending on the significance and scope of the election, either
a strong notion of voter privacy or verfiability might be appropriate. For instance, the
long-term privacy of the vote will be important for national elections, while the receipt-
freeness will not be as critical since it may be difficult to buy votes on a very large scale
without detection [CMFP+06]. Therefore it is important to know the possibilities which
are conceivable for implementing verifiability and privacy in electronic voting systems.
We introduced an intuitive and yet precise classification of anonymity, receipt-freeness
and coercion-resistance as well as individual and universal verifiability. We also defined
different levels of these requirements in order to provide a basis for an interdisciplinary
discussion.
We believe that an effective dialog between computer scientists and jurists is a precondi-
tion for developing secure electronic voting schemes. Thus, we hope to contribute to this
interdisciplinary dialog by providing an appropriate framework for the evaluation of com-
peting security requirements. Our classifications can in particular support the discussion
to which extent the considered properties should apply to electronic elections of different
significance, e.g. elections in associations or works council elections.
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